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I.

INTRODUCTION

What do musical artists Bob Dylan, 1 Loretta Lynn,2 Bruce Springsteen,
Kool and the Gang, 4 and original "Village People" member Victor Willis 5 all

have in common? During their lifetimes, these songwriters all successfully
served notice of termination to transferees of their copyright interests in their
musical compositions and reclaimed ownership of their copyrights. 6 In fact,
Willis, author 7 of the perennial karaoke hit YMC.A., is the first living artist to
successfully terminate the transfer of a post-1977 copyrighted musical
composition under section 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act.8
Willis may have been the first, but since 2013 an increasing number of
artists from all entertainment industry sectors have and will successfully serve
notices and terminate transfers and licenses that were thought at the time of

I

Bob Dylan is an iconic folk rock singer-songwriter whose career emerged in the 1960s and
whose songs often commented on and critiqued various social issues and ills of the day. See Bob
Dylan Bio, ROLLING STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/artists/bob-dylan/biography (last
visited Oct. 6, 2016).
2
Loretta Lynn is a renowned and beloved country singer and songwriter. She was inducted
into the Country Music Hall of Fame in 1988 and awarded the Pioneer Award at the 1995 Academy
of
Country
Music
Awards.
See
Loretta
Lynn
Bio,
ROLLING
STONE,
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/artists/loretta-lynn/biography (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
3
Bruce Springsteen is one of America's most treasured singer-songwriters, visionaries, and
political activists of modem times. His exceptional talent has spanned over four decades and he
continues to this day to use his passion and dedication to his craft to transform hearts and minds,
especially those in America's "heartland." See Bruce Springsteen Bio, ROLLING STONE,.
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/artists/bruce-springsteen/biography (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
4
The group Kool & the Gang has created hit after melodic hit for over four decades and they
show no signs of slowing down any time soon. Their songs always seemed more like timeless
anthems for life. Their catalogue is extensive and their hit songs include Celebration, Cherish,
JungleBoogie, and Summer Madness. See Jason Newman, Kool & the Gang: Our Life in 15 Songs,
ROLLING STONE (June 29, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/kool-the-gang-my-lifein-1 6-songs-20150629.

5
Self-proclaimed "Kings of Disco," The Village People, emerged to the height of success in
the late 1970s. Their hits include Macho Man, YMCA, In the Navy, and Go West. See Village People
Bio, ROLLING STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/artists/village-people/biography (last
visited Oct. 6, 2016).
6
See Larry Rohter, Record Industry Bracesfor Artists 'Battles Over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/arts/music/springsteen-and-others-sooneligible-to-recover-song-rights.html?_r-0.
7
Although section 101 of the Copyright Act does not define "author," the term is understood
broadly to include any creator of a copyright. A creator is one who creates a literary or artistic work
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
8
See Eriq Gardner, Village People Songwriter Victor Willis Wins Case Over Termination of
'YMCA.'
Rights,
HOLLYWOOD
REP.
(May
8,
2012,
10:32
AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/village-people-ymca-lawsuit-victor-willis-321576.
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contract to be irrevocable and perpetual. 9 The list of successful artists includes
the late Prince Rogers Nelson (aka Prince),' ° who, after an infamous and
legendary 18-year rights battle, reclaimed his music catalog from Warner
Brothers beginning with his debut album released in 1978.11 This Article focuses
on what has transpired since the 2013 termination window opened as termination
controversies move from the boardroom to the courtroom.
Owners of copyrighted works created on or after January 1, 1978, were
first empowered to begin terminating any transfers of those works on January 1,
2013. Because Willis (and the others) reclaimed control of their respective
copyright interests during their lifetimes, they are free to dispose of their
copyrights, as intangible personal property, during their lifetime in any way they
choose or they can exercise their testamentary freedom to transfer property at
death. 12
The testamentary freedom of creators of post-1977 copyrighted works
die
before the termination window becomes available, however, are not
who
nearly as free. The reason is that when a termination notice window opens,
certain statutorily prescribed heirs (herein called "Statutory Heirs" or "Heirs")
are empowered to close forever the testamentary intent door on the decedent
author's estate plans. The 1976 Copyright Act limits a creator's testamentary

9
See Q&A with Copyright Grant Termination Expert Lisa A. Alter, Esq., AUDITRIX, INC.
(Mar. 30, 2014), http://blog.auditrix.net/2014/03/q-with-copyright-grant-termination.html ("An
increasing number of authors are exercising their termination rights. Those who do not may simply
be unaware of the opportunity."); Eriq Gardner, Rock Band Boston Involved in Copyright
(Mar.
21,
2013,
9:06
AM),
Termination
Fight,
HOLLYWOOD
REP.
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/rock-band-boston-involved-copyright-430177
("Many song artists have done the math and filed termination notices to reclaim their works. Now
comes the lawsuits.").
10
Musical icon, producer, singer/songwriter, and performer, Prince Rogers Nelson, was bom
in Minneapolis, Minnesota on June 7, 1958. Prince Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM,
http://www.biography.com/people/prince-9447278 (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). He died in his home,
known as Paisley Park, of an apparent drug overdose on April 21, 2016. Id. His parents, who
predeceased him, were both musicians. Id. He had no spouse or descendants. Id. He also died
intestate, joining Amy Winehouse, Sonny Bono, and Steve McNair as mega stars with considerable
fortunes who died without a will. See Judy Martel, If Prince Really Left No Will, He Joins These 4
Other Celebrities Who Died Intestate, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/estateplanning/prince-other-celebrities-who-died-intestate-l.aspx#ixzz4HAy7nfCo (last visited Oct. 6,
2016). For an in-depth critical study of Prince's life and artistry, see generally TOURE, I WOULD
DIE 4 U: WHY PRINCE BECAME AN ICON (2013).
See Lisa Kay Davis, Prince Fought Big Labels for Ownership, Artistic Control,
11
NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:04 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/prince-foughtbig-labels-ownership-artistic-control-n560161; Shontavia Johnson, Why It's Tough to Find
Prince's Songs Online-and Other Musicians Are Thankful, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2016,
5:56
PM),
http://theconversation.com/why-its-tough-to-find-princes-songs-online-and-othermusicians-are-thankful-58321.
Other successful "terminators" include the Doobie Brothers, Tom Petty, Bryan Adams, and
12
Kris Kristofferson. See Rohter, supra note 6.
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freedom by expressly empowering Statutory Heirs to terminate decedent's
lifetime copyright transfers and to assume ownership of those assets or to undo
a testamentary plan created to benefit an author-controlled, author-benefiting
entity ("ACAB"). 13 This holds true even if the decedent gratuitously transfers a
copyright interest to, for example, an ACAB entity like a charitable organization,
into her own grantor or asset protection trust, or to someone who does not qualify
as a Statutory Heir.
This limitation on an author's testamentary freedom also extends any
lifetime transfers the author makes to his or her loan-out company or music
publishing company. 1 4 In addition to terminating an author's lifetime gratuitous
transfers, a disgruntled heir can also thwart a decedent's will provisions
involving or relating to copyright (e.g., copyright royalties) to the extent they
benefit someone or some entity other than a Statutory Heir.
Case in point is Ray Charles Foundation v. Robinson15 in which the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the Foundation, which relied upon royalties
generated by copyrights held by assignee music publisher Wamer/Chappell,
could sue Charles's heirs for their attempt to terminate copyright transfers that
Charles made to the music publisher.1 6 This incongruous treatment of probate
and nonprobate transfers leaves authors at risk of diminished testamentary
freedom to select the most advantageous means of exploiting and protecting their
intellectual property assets because of the ever present risk that Statutory Heirs
can later exercise their termination right and undo all of the author's beneficial
financial, tax, and estate planning. In fact, concerns about the incongruous results
between probate and nonprobate dispositions under succession laws led the
Uniform Law Commission to create rules that would render results that are more
consistent. Consistent results, therefore, seem the optimal result.
Many scholars, practitioners, and copyright transferees in the
entertainment business surmised the likely impact of the first reclamation trigger
date of January 1, 2013, under section 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act on post1977 transfer terminations. 17 Some also expressed concern with the apparent
distinction between, and treatment of, transfers by will and nonprobate
transfers.1 8 In this Article, I focus on what has actually transpired since that
trigger date. Specifically, I argue that Congress should treat certain lifetime
gratuitous author transfers to ACAB business and nonprobate entities in the same
way that transfers by will are treated. I assert that parity in the treatment of wills

I refer to these transfers collectively as author-controlled, author-benefiting ("ACAB")
transfers.
13

14
15

See infra Part IV.
795 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2015).

16

See infra Part IV.

17

See infra text accompanying notes 25-48.

18

See infra text accompanying notes 45-53.
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and will substitutes is necessary given the rise in importance and frequency of
use by celebrities of those ACAB vehicles. I propose a statutory amendment to
prevent Statutory Heirs from terminating the decedent author's lifetime
gratuitous transfers to best protect the author's testamentary intent and valuable
copyright ACAB transfers in the same way testamentary transfers are protected.
Finally, I discuss post-1977 termination cases, which are just starting to make
their way through the court system, to highlight the unintended consequences of
Statutory Heir termination.
In Part I, I explore the legislative history and purpose of the transfer
termination right to highlight why Congress added it in 1976 and why transfers
made by will are not subject to termination. Further, I compare and contrast
briefly pre-1978 (section 304) and post-1977 (section 203) termination rights.
In Part II, I explore the history and importance of testamentary freedom
as an organizing principle of succession law.1 9 Additionally, I highlight the trend
led by the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code to interpret succession laws
expansively in order to glean and to honor testamentary intent. In this part, I also
discuss the traditional limitations on testamentary freedom in favor of certain
favored familial relationships like that of spouse and child, namely the elective
share in common law states and pretermitted heir statutes.
In Part III, I examine the historical development and emergence of will
substitutes in succession law.20 First, I identify and discuss the common types of
will substitutes. Next, I focus more specifically on the types of nonprobate
transfer vehicles typically involved in the entertainment industry that an artist
might use to hold copyright interests and other intellectual property during their
lifetimes and to transfer those same assets at the artist's death. These types
include self-settled trusts, private foundations, and asset protection trusts.
In Part IV, I examine the role and prevalence of celebrity loan-out
companies and music publishing companies in the entertainment industry.
Entertainers across entertainment sectors often set up loan out corporations as a
way to protect their assets and secure certain tax benefits.21 Usually, the
entertainer acts as an employee of the corporate entity and the entity enters into
contracts with other businesses such as a production company. The company
"loans out" the services of the actor to the production company and may also
19

See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post

Justifications,82 FORDHAM L. REv. 1125, 1133-34 (2013).
20

See Dennis M. Horn & Susan N. Gary, Death Without ProbateTOD Deeds-the Latest Tool

in the Toolbox, 24 PROB. & PROP. 13, 13 (2010). See generally John H. Langbein, Major Reforms
of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and
Nonprobate Transfers, 38 AM. C. TR. & EST. CouNs. L.J. 1 (2012); John H. Langbein, The
Nonprobate Revolution and the Futureof the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1108 (1984)
[hereinafter The Nonprobate Revolution].
21
See Russ Alan Prince, What Is a Celebrity Loan Out Corporation?,FORBES (Oct. 27, 2014,
6:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2014/10/27/what-is-a-celebrity-loan-outcorporation.
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receive transfers of copyright interests and, after the entity is formed, acquire
control of copyrights on a work-for-hire basis to insulate them from the
termination right altogether. Music publishing companies are used to control and
exploit songwriting copyrights. A songwriter's music publishing company may
also receive transfers initially and then own future copyrights created by the
songwriter on a work-for-hire basis. ACAB transfers to these business entities
are vulnerable to Statutory Heir termination.
In Part V, I analyze several ACAB transfer termination cases where
heirs, who inherited the unexercised termination right, challenged a decedent's
copyright transfer into an author-created vehicle designed to pass copyright
ownership (or the benefits that flow therefrom) to someone or some entity other
than those heirs. To that end, I examine the facts and outcome of Ray Charles
Foundation v. Robinson, the most prominent and recent case involving an
analogous fact pattern. 22 Thereafter, I highlight several pre-1978 cases that
interpret section 304. I use those cases to serve as a guidepost for how statutory
heirs can effect termination in a way that is contrary to an author's testamentary
intent and to highlight how common it was under section 304 for an heir to
challenge an author's lifetime disposition of copyright assets and create an endrun around the author's estate plans.
Finally, in Part VI, I offer ways to effectively reconcile the copyright
succession rules to best balance an author's lifetime and testamentary wishes
with the policies underlying the government's interest in protecting the welfare
of author's closest heirs if the author dies before having the opportunity to
exercise his or her termination right.
For example, Congress could amend the Act to except from "any
transfer" those that would qualify as author-benefiting transfers to authorcontrolled vehicles or closely held corporate entities. This exception could be
unlimited or limited to a certain time period from the date the author created the
receiving ACAB entity.
II. THE HISTORY AND ROLE OF COPYRIGHT TRANSFER TERMINATION

The Copyright Act provides that an author may transfer ownership of a
copyright in whole or in part "by any means of conveyance" during life and at
death by will or intestate succession.2 3 The Act also gives authors the right to
terminate any inter vivos transfer and to reclaim ownership of the transferred
copyright interest 35 years after the date of transfer.24 The termination right exists
regardless of any agreement that purports to irrevocably grant copyright to the
transferee. This right, therefore, is nonwaviable and inalienable. However, an
unexercised right is inheritable.

23

Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109(9th Cir. 2015).
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012).

24

See infra Part II.B.

22

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119

If the author dies before exercising her termination right, her Statutory
Heirs (spouse, child, or grandchild) inherit the termination right and can
terminate any lifetime transfer made by the decedent author. Although any inter
vivos transfer that an author makes can be terminated by her Statutory Heirs,
ownership interests transferred at death via will or intestate succession cannot be
terminated. 25 Therefore, a decedent author's testamentary freedom is preserved
in the case of probate transfers, but the author is not similarly protected when his
or her testamentary scheme includes an ACAB transfer.
This result is problematic given the prevalence of author transfers to
ACAB entities for business, tax, and other reasons beneficial to the author,
particularly in the entertainment industry. Examples of such transfers include
those made into a performing artist's loan-out company or a songwriter's lifetime
transfer of musical composition and sound recording copyrights into a music
publishing company. Other examples include transfers to a grantor trust,
charitable foundation, or an author's closely held business entity.
The practical effect is that a Statutory Heir who inherits the right to
terminate may exercise that right and successfully reclaim copyright ownership
against the decedent's intent to transfer copyright ownership at death to a person
(or entity) other than that statutorily prescribed heir. Congress enacted the
termination provisions to protect authors from being saddled for the full
copyright term with bad deals made early in their careers when they had little, if
any, bargaining power.26
However, Congress did not intend for the right to prevent authors from
making advantageous lifetime transfers into vehicles controlled by the author for
prudent business, tax, and estate planning reasons. To the contrary, Congress
sought to empower authors to reap the financial benefits the copyright exclusivity
monopoly was intended to protect. Given that intelligent estate planning is a key
pragmatic justification for testamentary freedom, copyright law must be
reconciled and made consistent with the general goal of probate law to encourage
individuals to thoughtfully capture their wishes in a writing and to honor their
actual or probable intentions.27
A. Transfer Termination, Generally
The Copyright Act states that copyright ownership "may be transferred
in whole or in part by any means of conveyance," by will or intestate
succession.28 As noted above, any inter vivos transfer that an author makes can

25

Lee-ford Tritt, LiberatingEstates Law from the Constraintsof Copyright, 38

RUTGERS

L.J.

109, 166 (2006).
26
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
27
See generally infra Part II.
28

17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012).
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be terminated by Statutory Heirs, but interests transferred at death via will or
intestate succession cannot be so terminated.29
If an author does not want his or her plans upset by a Statutory Heir's
exercise of the termination rights, the author might, theoretically, decide to
transfer the rights only by will. 30 However, that approach is impractical at best.
Most copyrighted works in the entertainment industry would remain either
unexploited or underexploited (and therefore of minimal value) unless
transferred to a recording company, publisher, studio, or other similarly situated
entity in a far better position to distribute, monetize, and otherwise exploit the
work. This remains true despite the impact the Internet and digital technology
have had in substantially leveling the playing field between artists and
entertainment industry middlemen. The entertainment industry middlemen were
historically positioned as the gatekeepers to distribute content and to provide
access to consumers.3 '
B. The Mechanics of Termination
An author who transfers or licenses a copyrighted work created on or
after January 1, 1978, (aka a post-1977 or section 203 transfer), other than worksmade-for-hire,32 in whole or in part, may terminate those transfers 35 years after
transfer (or publication) and effectively reclaim copyright ownership. 33 A

29

Tritt, supra note 25, at 166.

30

HOwARD B. ABRAMs, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 12.29 (2014).

31
See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 63,
118-27 (2002).
32
Congress defined a "work-made-for-hire" as:

(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a
"supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as a secondary
adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding,
illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of
the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps,
charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests,
bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a
literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the
purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
33

Specifically,
[T]ermination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five
years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
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transfer includes any "conveyance" or "alienation., 34 Upon termination, all
section 106 rights35 of the Copyright Act revert to the original author or interest
holder.36 Finally, section 203 termination is determined from the date at which
the grant was made.37 This means that even for copyrighted works created before
1978, section 203 may apply so long as the transfer was made after January 1,
1978.38

The termination right is inalienable and unwaivable. 39 Therefore, it
cannot be contracted away. However, it can be lost if the transferor does not
precisely follow the highly technical and complex termination rules.4n If the
creator dies before the termination window, the right is inherited and exercisable
by the creator's surviving Statutory Heirs. If there are none, "the author's
executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee" will control the
reversionary interest and right to terminate. 41 A majority of the interest holders

grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period
begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work
under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the
grant, whichever term ends earlier.
Id. § 203(a)(3).
34
Id. § 101.
35
This includes the rights to reproduce, distribute, adapt, publicly display, or publicly perform.
Id. § 106(l)-(5).
36
Id. § 203(b).
37

Id.

Id. § 203(a).
See e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) ("The 1976 Copyright Act...
provides an inalienable termination right."); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 282
(2d Cir. 2002) ("Section 304(c) grants... an inalienable right to terminate ....
");Music Sales
Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[U]nlike the renewal right[], the
termination right is inalienable. Neither the author nor the statutory heirs may contract away their
termination right ....
").
40
William Patry explained that the author's affirmative duty to follow precisely the complex
and confounding termination rules reflects a "weakening" agreed to by "authors, distributors, the
Copyright Office, and Congress." William Patry, The Failureof the American Copyright System:
Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 907, 921 (1997). The compromise required
copyright owners to serve notice of termination rather than allowing termination to occur
automatically. Id. (explaining that "[t]he weakening occurred not by forcing authors to wait thirtyfive years to terminate instead of twenty-five years (although this was a weakening), but by deleting
their automatic nature"). As further evidence of the notice requirement's deleterious impact on an
author's rights, "the hoops erected for filing the termination notice are even more complicated than
those for filing a renewal application." Id.
41
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(D) (2012); see also Melville Nimmer, Termination of Transfers
Under the CopyrightAct of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 947, 967 (1977) ("If an author dies before the
rights subject to termination have been vested in him or her by such termination, the author's
termination interest passes to the author's surviving spouse and children (and in some cases,
grandchildren) in the proportions described [in § 203(a)(2)(A); § 203(a)(4); 304(c)(2)(A); and §
304(c)(4)].").
38
39
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must agree in order to exercise the termination right if the author's interest is
divided between multiple Heirs.42
For renewal rights transferred before 1978 (pre-1978 or section 304
transfers), authors and their statutory successors have the right to terminate the
transfer at any time during a five-year period that begins January 1, 1978, or 56
years after the date the statutory copyright was secured, whichever is later.43
When Congress adopted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998, 4 it added section 304(d), which applies to transfers made before January
1, 1978. Section 304(d) provides for the extended 20 year period a termination
right to authors and successors whose original termination rights had, as of
October 26, 1998, expired without being exercised.4 5
Overall, the key difference between section 203 and section 304 is how
the time frame is determined. Section 203 is based on the date the author executes
the grant.46 Section 304 is based on the date the copyright was originally
secured.4 7 In either case, the author can terminate a grant at any time during a
period of 5 years beginning at the end of 30 years from the date the copyright
was originally secured.48
C. The Termination Right's Predecessor:The Renewal Term

Under the 1909 version of the Copyright Act,49 the Copyright regime
consisted of two terms. Copyright protection lasted for 28 years for the first term
and, if timely and properly renewed, a second 28-year period. This resulted in a

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2)(C), 304(c)(2)(C) (2012); see also 3 NIMMER&NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 11.03[A][2][b] (2006) ("If a grant is executed by an author who does not survive
42

until the vesting of the termination interest, a statutorily defined 'per stirpes majority' of those who
succeed to the deceased author's termination interest is entitled to terminate the grant.").
43
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (2012).
44
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
[hereinafter CTEA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). This Act increased
the term of all subsisting copyrights by 20 years.
45
See 17 U.S.C. § 304(d)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153,
163 (1985) (labeling the post-termination interest a "reversion"); Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog,
Inc., 805 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 2015) ("When an author or his statutory heirs serves a termination
notice, the grantee's previously undivided copyright interest is effectively split into three pieces,
one owned by the author or his statutory heirs and two owned by the grantee. The author (or his
statutory heirs) holds a future interest in the copyright."); Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Basin,
Copyright Termination andLoan-Out Corporations:Reconciling Practice and Policy, 3 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 55, 61 (2012).
46
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012).
47
Pierre B. Pine, You're Terminated! Termination and Reversion of Copyright Grantsand the
Termination Gap Dilemma, 31 ENT. & SPORTS L., May 2014, at 1, 27.
48
17 U.S.C. § 304(d)(2) (2012).
49
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976).
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maximum duration of 56 years. 50 However, if the copyright owner did not renew,
the work fell into the public domain after the first term. 51 Authors at that time
were generally required to assign both the initial and renewal copyright terms to
publishers.52 The practice of forcing authors to part with both present and future
interests in their copyrights was upheld by the Supreme Court in Fred Fisher
& Sons.53 However, the result in that case was contrary
Music Co. v. M. Witmark
54
to congressional intent.
In response, Congress made explicitly clear in the 1976 Act and again 5in6
55
the 1998 amendment that termination rights are inalienable and unwaivable.
Congress intended to provide authors a second chance to benefit financially if
the work proved valuable over time. This rather paternalistic approach reflected
the reality that copyright creators often have little bargaining power in
comparison to corporate assignees. Accordingly, 57Congress created inalienable
termination rights to avoid the Fred Fisherresult.

Congress'sIntent in Creating the Transfer Termination Right

D.

The 1976 Copyright Act, which took effect on January 1, 1978, replaced
the two-term system of the 1909 Act with a single term that endured for the life
of the author, plus 50 years after the author's death.58 Congress extended the term

Moss & Basin, supra note 45, at 58 (citing Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35
50
Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976)).
51

Id.

52

Id.

53
318 U.S. 643 (1943); see also Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-PoohingCopyright
Law's "Inalienable" TerminationRights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 799, 804 (2010).
54
The House Committee wrote:
If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twentyeight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the
author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is existing
law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.
H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14-15 (1909).
55
See CTEA, supra note 44.
56
Congress made explicit its intent to ensure that authors could not be forced to contract away
or around the termination right: "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant." 17
U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5), 304(d)(1) (2015).
57
See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 ("It not infrequently happens that the author sells his
copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum."); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 218-19 (1990) ("In this way, Congress attempted to give the author a second chance to
control and benefit from his work.... The renewal term permits the author, originally in a poor
bargaining position, to renegotiate the terms of the grant once the value of the work has been
tested.").
58
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2015)).
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an additional 20 years in 1998.' 9 For pre-1978 copyrights, the 1976 Act extended
the renewal term by 19 years, thereby increasing the total protection of those
works to 75 years.60
When Congress deliberated about how to amend the renewal provisions
of the 1909 Act, the main concern was that many authors or heirs of predeceased
authors might not be able to exploit an extended renewal term because of prior
assignment of a copyrighted work's first and renewal terms. 61 To combat this,
Congress created a new right of termination which enabled authors, and certain
heirs, to recapture rights that had been previously granted.62 Congress's intent
was to ensure that authors would not be unfairly exploited due to the unequal
bargaining position of the author without any further recourse or opportunity to
renegotiate if and when the work's value is realized and proves lucrative. 63 The
Supreme Court expressly affirmed this congressional intent to create a new
inalienable "estate" in Stewart v. Abend.64
In early drafts to amend the two-term system, the Copyright Office
recommended a unified term with an automatic termination right.65 Publishers
and distributors, of course, vehemently opposed the automatic feature and the
industry reached a compromise. Congress adopted the compromise and created
a unified term of life of the author plus 50 years after the author's death and a
termination right that required the author (or author's Statutory Heirs or
representative) to take specific affirmative action.66 The transfer termination
notice provisions, however, did not negate Congress's clear intent for the
termination right to be inalienable and nonwaivable.6 7 Congress confined the
termination right to lifetime transfers executed by the author and did not extend

59

CTEA, supra note 44.

17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2015)). This term is known
as the "extended renewal term."
61
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
62
Id. at 125-26.
60

Id. at 124.
495 U.S. 207, 208 (1990) ("The renewal provisions... e.g., their legislative history, and
the case law interpreting them establish that they were intended both to give the author a second
chance to obtain fair remuneration for his creative efforts and to provide his family, or his executors
absent surviving family, with a 'new estate' if he died before the renewal period arrived.").
65
See Patry, supra note 40, at 921 ("These termination proposals were strongly objected to by
distributors and strongly defended by authors, and became, in the words of the Copyright Office,
'the most explosive and difficult issue in the revision process."').
66 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). The types of affirmative action discussed included
serving advance notice within specified time limits and under specified conditions. See also Patry,
supra note 40.
67 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124-25 (1976).
63
64
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it to transfers by the author's successors in interest or to the author's own
testamentary bequests.68
At the time Congress debated the merits and details of the termination,
the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"), which sought primarily to simplify, clarify,
and reconcile state testacy and intestacy succession laws to best glean and honor
a decedent's intent, had only been in existence for a few years. 69 Additionally,
nonprobate vehicles like trusts, joint tenancies, contracts of deposit, payable-ondeath accounts, and similar arrangements were just emerging as viable
7°
alternatives to transfer property at death instead of or in conjunction with a will:
The congressional record does not show any debate about whether to
also except author transfers by will substitute. Rather than including emerging
means to distribute property, Congress seemed to focus instead on the traditional
method of transferring property at death: the will. Congress chose to expressly
except this most essential author-controlled testamentary disposition of
copyright. Because will substitutes serve an analogous goal by different but
equally effective means, Congress should similarly except will substitutes that
meet the ACAB scheme definition discussed in section III.B.
III.

THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
IN PROBATE LAW AND LIMITATIONS

In this part, I explore the import of testamentary freedom historically and
the trend led by the drafters of the UPC to interpret succession laws expansively
to glean and to honor testamentary intent. I also discuss the various justifications
for testamentary freedom and limits on this freedom in favor of certain favored
familial relationships like that of spouse and child; most notably spousal elective
share and pretermitted heir statutes.
A. TestamentaryFreedom: A HistoricalLook

Testamentary freedom, the governing principle of American succession
law, is the belief that individuals have the right to dispose of their property as
they please at death.71 Over time, testamentary freedom has been identified as an
important stick in the proverbial bundle of property rights.72 The basic premise
on which testamentary freedom rests is that individuals should control the
disposition of their property at death, much like they control its usage and

68

Id. at 125.

69

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102 (amended 2010).

70

See SUSAN N. GARY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 8, 153-

59 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
71
Tritt, supra note 25, at 109, 115-16.
72
Id. at 116.
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disposition during life. 3 Testamentary freedom encompasses a variety of
property rights, including:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The right to gift or devise during life or death;
The right to choose to whom to devise the property;
The ability to place conditions on the transfers;
The right to choose the character and timing of receiving the
property; and
(5)The ability to appoint others to make the decisions instead.74
In sum, testamentary freedom is integral to one's property rights.
Because the organizing principle in American property jurisprudence is
freedom of disposition, the purpose of American law should be to facilitate
instead of unduly regulate that principle. 75 This public policy is codified in the
UPC. 7 6 In fact, one of the UPC's express purposes is to "discover and make
77
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his [or her] property.,,
The law of wills dates as far back as 449 A.D. 78 Early on, like most
societies of the time, donative transfers followed a scheme of intestacy and did
not recognize wills. 79 Gradually, however, succession law moved in the direction
of permitting the decedent's power to dispose of property at death.8 °
Testamentary freedom appears to have been less important during this period of
time because the family's claim took precedence over the individual's post-death
wishes.81
A major advance in the evolution of testamentary freedom came in 1066
with King William I's conquest of England. That invasion introduced feudalism
to the English property system, which served as the foundation for American
property law.82 Promotion of the feudal system led to the common law courts
exercising jurisdiction over real property instead of the church.8 3 This shift

73

Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 19, at 1127 ("One justification for privileging donative intent,

like the justification for deferring to owners in how they use their property, is that doing so will
promote social welfare.").
74

Tritt, supra note 25, at 116.

75

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM.

LAW INST.

76

2003).

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(2) (amended 2010).

77
Id. The UPC has been adopted, at least in part, by 18 states. Uniform Probate Code,LEGAL
INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniformiprobate (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
78
Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 51
VILL. L. REV. 25, 62 (2006).
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 63.

82

Id.

83

Id.
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moved away from devises of land and to a system where the eldest son always
succeeded to real property. 84 The only way that the eldest son could be prevented
from inheriting the land was for the father to convey it to a third party before
death.5
86
The disposition of personal property was entirely different at that time.
Personal property still fell within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts,
which recognized wills as a method of disposition. 87 Nonetheless, there was still
a limitation on a decedent's testamentary freedom, in the form of the legitim 88
89
that granted forced shares to the testator's surviving spouse and descendants.
Generally speaking, this left only a portion of a testator's personal property to be
devised as he saw fit. 90
Property owners, of course, did not approve of any limitations on their
testamentary freedom since their desires were being circumvented by the
primogeniture system, which forced a particular result and disposition. 91
However, it was not until 1540, when the Statute of Wills was enacted, that the
right to devise property by will became widely accepted. 92 A fundamental
purpose of the Statute of Wills was to enable decedents to93 dispose of their
property and to support their families in the ways they see fit.
Early American property law rested on the English approach and
adopted the idea of property disposition by will. 94 By 1800, almost all American
states had abolished any rule of primogeniture because it was determined to be
incompatible with a "republican form of government." 95 The importance of
testamentary freedom in American succession law in the past cannot be
underestimated. 96 Society continues to recognize the inherent value in protecting

84

Id. at 64.

85
Joshua C. Tate, Caregivingand the Casefor Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
129, 150 (2008).
86
Id.
87

Id.

Legitim is defined as: "the portion of an estate usually including both real and personal
property reserved to the children and sometimes other heirs upon the death of the father under
UNABRIDGED,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
Legitim,
law."
Scots
and
civil,
Roman,
http://unabridged.merriamwebster.com/unabridged/legitim (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
Tate, supra note 85, at 150-51.
89
88

90

Id.at 151.

91

See id.
Champine, supra note 78, at 64.

92

Id. at 64-65.
94
Tate, supra note 85, at 154.
95 Id. at 155.
Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An UnadulteratedFunctionally Based Approach to
96
Parent-ChildPropertySuccession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 375 (2009).
93
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an individual's ability to acquire and transfer private property during life and at
death. 97 The concept of testamentary freedom is an essential stick in the bundle
of property rights. 98 The influence and import of testamentary freedom has
persisted. Therefore, I argue that copyright law should reflect this enduring,
fundamental purpose in the disposition of copyright, categorized as intangible
personal property, and treat nonprobate ACAB transfers the same as
testamentary transfers.
B. Various Justificationsfor TestamentaryFreedom
The reasons for America's steadfast recognition of testamentary
freedom, and its importance generally rests on basic human pleasures and
desires. 99 However, these desires are supported by a variety of economic,
philosophical, and societal values. 100 Professor Lee-ford Tritt explains that the
development of testamentary freedom can be traced to, and aligned with, various
jurisprudential and pragmatic justifications. 10 1 I will discuss each in turn.
1. Jurisprudential Justifications
102
Jurisprudence is best and widely understood to mean legal philosophy.
The etymology of the word jurisprudence (and jurisprudential) finds it origins in
the Latin term ' Jurisprudentia, which means 'the study, knowledge, or science
of law.""' 01 3 In the estates law context, Professor Lee-ford Tritt curates a set of
jurisprudential justifications that apply more specifically to testamentary
freedom. Each of the approaches he describes offers its own rationale for why
testamentary freedom has endured and remains essential as a foundational
principle of succession law.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

See generally Tritt, supra note 25, at 118-30; Terry L. Tumipseed, Why Shouldn't I Be

Allowed to Leave My Property to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (or How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and StartLoving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 751-61 (2006).
102

See

Jurisprudence,

THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,

http:/legal-

dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/jurisprudence (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). The site explains
further that the terms are more broadly understood in the United States as the science or philosophy
of law. Id.
103

Id.
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i. The "NaturalRight" Justification

The natural right justification suggests that it is an individual's innate
privilege to control the consumption and disposition of her property during
life. 10 4 Since this natural right predates civil law, it is beyond the government's
power. 105 Various philosophers, including Hugh Grotius, John Locke, and JeanJacques Burlamaqui, have all been linked to the natural rights approach to
testamentary freedom. 106
However, there were various critics as well, including philosopher
William Blackstone. 10 7 Blackstone argued that although we have a natural right
to property during life, that natural right ends at death. 108 Regardless of its initial
proponents and critics, the idea that testamentary freedom is a natural right
persists even today. 10 9 Various state courts110 have held that the right to transfer
property by will is a natural property right recognized by law. 1
ii. UtilitarianJustification

A second jurisprudential justification for testamentary freedom is based
on utilitarian principles. 12 These principles are premised on the rationale that
'1 13
"individuals derive personal pleasure [from] bequeathing property to others."
Proponents of this utilitarian justification can be traced back to the thirteenth
century, when it was argued that testamentary freedom "encourages individual
initiative, investments, and savings. '' 14 Modem social scientists have supported
a similar theory known as wealth maximization.1 15 Their argument is that if
testamentary freedom is limited, the limitation would decrease the value 1of16
property, but if promoted, it would motivate individuals to save and invest.

104

Tritt, supra note 25, at 118.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107
108

Id. at 119.
Id. If this justification applies then, presumably, Statutory Heirs inherit a new right.

109

Id.

110
See id. at 119-20 (citing Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So.2d 64 (Fla.
1990); In re Estate of Beale, 113 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1962); In re Will of Hopkins, 79 N.W. 2d 131
(Wis. 1956); Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N.W. 627 (Wis. 1906)).
III
Id. at 119-20.
112
Id. at 121.
114

Id.
Id.

11

Id. at 122.

116

Id.

113
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Overall, both utilitarian and wealth maximization based rationales also remain
prevalent today.
iii. Orthodox Economics Justification
17
A third jurisprudential justification is known as orthodox economics,
which combines the natural right and utilitarian rationales. Orthodox economists
believe testamentary freedom is a state-sanctioned natural right. 1 8 In furtherance
of this view is a "slippery-slope" concern that if the state is empowered to forbid
property succession, then it could also forbid lifetime gifts (an undesirable
result).' 19 While not as prevalent or strongly supported, orthodox
economics is
20
still an accepted premise for supporting testamentary freedom.

iv. LibertarianJustification

A final jurisprudential justification is libertarianism. 121This rationale is
based on the belief in complete freedom of the individual. 122 As a result of this
dogged individualism, any right to manage, consume, and dispose of property
during one's life necessarily carries with it the absolute right to control the
distribution of property at death. 123 This justification supports and promotes
testamentary freedom as an essential individual right.
In sum, these jurisprudential justifications all promote an inherent right
of the individual testator to dispose of property at death either by will, intestate
succession, or by way of a nonprobate vehicle. Regardless of the justifications
adopted and applied, testamentary freedom has and continues to hold very
important jurisprudential rationales for its existence.
2. Pragmatic Justifications
Legal pragmatists take an opposite view of the jurisprudential
124
underpinnings of law, generally, and judicial decision-making, specifically.
Legal pragmatists challenge the traditional notions of legal theory by
emphasizing its practical application "best thought of as a practice that is rooted

117

Id. at 123.

118

120

Id.
Id. (quoting RONALD
Id. at 124.

121

Id.

122
123

Id.
Id.

124

See Brian

119

Edgar

CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY

Butler,

Legal Pragmatism,

INTERNET

26 (1982)).

ENCYCLOPEDIA

PHIL.,

http://www.iep.utm.edu/legiprag/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
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in the specific context at hand, without secure foundations, instrumental, and
always attached to a perspective." 125 Professor Tritt offers four practical
justifications for testamentary freedom, explained below.
i. Marketfor Social Services
One pragmatic justification for testamentary freedom can be classified
as the market for social services. 126 This approach is premised on the belief that
testamentary freedom incentivizes potential beneficiaries to take responsibility
127
for their family because of the potential testamentary gift that may await them.
One can trace this approach back to the thirteenth century, where philosopher
Henry de Bracton28believed that spouses and children were incentivized to treat
the testator well. 1
Furthermore, with the incentive of potentially receiving a bequest,
testamentary freedom could promote family harmony because, presumably, no
one wants to be left out of the will. 129 Arguments against this approach are
premised on the idea that care should be, and is1given,
to those who need care,
30
and thus the care is not based on some incentive.
ii. IntellectualEstatePlanningJustification
A second pragmatic justification is the promotion of intelligent estate
planning. 13 1 This rationale applies well in the case of copyright creators in the
entertainment industry. This justification is based on the fact that someone who
takes the time to create an estate plan, probably has specific gifts and bequests in
mind. 132 If the decedent were to die intestate, the "statutory will" distributions
1 33
under intestacy statutes may be nothing like what the decedent intended.
Allowing the freedom to distribute one's property as she sees fit encourages an
individual to take the time to create a will or will substitute to capture her
intentions. 134

125

Id.

126

Tritt, supra note 25, at 125.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 126.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

See id.
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iii. Non-TraditionalFamily Structures
A third pragmatic justification in support of robust testamentary freedom
is that it allows individuals to effectuate their intentions based on their particular
family structure and situation.13 From the effects of divorce and remarriage, to
children born out of wedlock, to unmarried couples living together, and samesex adoption and the legality of same-sex marriages, 136 testamentary freedom
provides an avenue to meet the needs that individuals in those situations may be
one's property distributions is key
facing. 137 Having the flexibility to custom-fit
138
to promoting testamentary freedom.
iv. Administrative Efficiency
Finally, administrative efficiency (also known as ease) is the fourth
pragmatic justification. It would be impossible for the state to police property
transfers at death by prohibiting them completely.139 Such a ban would also be
ineffective and, therefore, inefficient. 4 ° Absent testamentary freedom, people
would still find some way to transfer their property. 41 Thus, support of
testamentary freedom is important to ensure people have sufficient resources to
also sufficient legal leeway to provide for those they wish to after their
live, and
42
death.'
In sum, these four considerations highlight the more practical-rather
than theoretical-reasons that testamentary freedom has persisted as the bedrock
of testamentary freedom is integral to
of American succession laws. Promotion
143
the structure of property succession.
C. Limitations on Testamentary Freedom
Despite a well-established history in succession law of protecting a
testator's freedom, limits on this freedom are not unusual. For example, states
have historically protected spouses and children-even contrary to a decedent's

135

Id. at 128.

136

138

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Tritt, supra note 25, at 128-29.
Id. at 129.

139

Id.

137

Id.
Id. at 129 ("If the state were to prohibit succession of property at death, individuals simply
would find other means to circumvent the ban and to distribute their property to intended
beneficiaries (such as through various forms of lifetime gifts, creation of corporations to pay
'salaries' to the intended beneficiaries or low interest loans to the intended beneficiaries).").
140

141

142

Id.

143

Id.
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wishes-with community property regimes,144 spousal elections, pretermitted
145
heir statutes, antilapse statutes, as well as a host of allowances and exemptions.
There are numerous public policy reasons to protect certain family
members despite a testator's wishes. 146 Weighing the benefits and drawbacks of
allowing the law to intervene and alter testamentary dispositions despite a
testator's wishes is a perennial debate. 147 However, maximizing an heir's
inheritance alone, especially if such a goal is contrary to the testator's intentions
and overall testamentary scheme, should not be included among those
justifications.
IV. THE EMERGENCE AND DOMINANT ROLE OF WILL SUBSTITUTES

Since the mid-1960s, when Norman Dacey's How to Avoid Probate
became popular, the use of will substitutes, particularly to avoid probate, has
continued to increase. 148 Now, this mainstream demand for probate avoidance
"has coincided with a fundamental change in the nature of wealth.,, 149 The
confluence of these primary 0 influences has been integral to the rise and
15
utilization of will substitutes.

144 Although beyond the scope of this Article, for an informative and thought-provoking

analysis of whether an author-spouse may terminate the transfer of copyright in the context of a
domestic relationship, see Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Then, You Had It, Now, It's Gone:
Interspousal or Community Property Transfer and Termination of an Illusory Ephemeral State
Law Right or Interest in a Copyright, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97 (2013). In
that Article, the author concludes, "in the context of copyright termination, the domestic
relationship, and state law, the author-spouse will always be able to nullify the carefully ordered
state law presumptions for domestic relations and the possible ensuing dissolution of the marital
union." Id. at 98.
145
These laws include dispositions related to: spousal rights; creditors' rights; unreasonable
restraints on alienation or marriage; provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible
racial or other categorical restrictions; provisions encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against
perpetuities and accumulations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003); SUSAN N. GARY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS

AND ESTATES 605-07 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing state override of testator wishes to protect "the
natural objects of one's bounty" against disinheritance). Professor Gary also questions whether the
law should continue to protect spouses against disinheritance now that the social and marital
landscape has changed. Susan N. Gary, The Oregon Elective Share Statute: Is Reform an
Impossible Dream?,44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 337, 338-40 (2007).
146 See Kelly, supra note 19, at 1128 (asserting that reasonable justifications for limits on
testamentary freedom include "imperfect information, negative externalities, and intergenerational
equity").
147
See id. at 11l31.
148 The Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 20, at 1116.
149

Id.

150

Id. at 1108.
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The average individual typically utilizes both a will (to the extent one is
used at all) and a variety of will substitutes. 151 And high net worth individuals
like successful artists and entertainers, who require sophisticated wealth transfer
and asset protection planning strategies, regularly incorporate a wide range of
complex, nuanced 52lifetime and testamentary techniques to achieve their estate
planning scheme.1
A.

Will Substitutes, Generally

At least three significant differences exist between wills and will
substitutes: will substitutes are primarily asset specific, property covered by a
will substitute avoids probate, and the formal requirements for wills do not apply
to will substitutes. 5 3 Overall, while wills still accomplish necessary functions,
the use of will substitutes has increased greatly by the average person and, even
more so, in the entertainment industry. Not only are will substitutes more
convenient, they are easier to create and afford far more privacy and, in some
cases, greater tax benefits. As a result, will 154substitutes have become the
predominant contemporary estate planning tool.
A will substitute is defined as:
[A]n arrangement respecting property or contract rights that is
established during the donor's life, under which (1) the right to
possession or enjoyment of the property or to a contractual
payment shifts outside of probate to the donee at the donor's
death; and (2) substantial lifetime rights of dominion,
55 control,
possession, or enjoyment are retained by the donor.

151
Id. at 1115; see also GARY ET AL., supra note 70, at 8, 171 (stating that the utilization of
methods incorporating both probate and nonprobate dispositions can be characterized as a
"comprehensive estate plan").

Robert G. Alexander & Dallas E. Klemmer, Creative Wealth Planningwith GrantorTrusts,
Family Limited Partnerships, and Family Limited Liability Companies, 2 EST. PLAN. &
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 307, 310 (2010). The authors explain that, "[t]he best planning occurs when
several components are blended together to create an efficient, comprehensive plan to accomplish
wealth shifting and asset protection in perpetuity." Id. Further, the authors explain that,
"[t]ypically, the components of this planning include trusts, leveraged wealth shifting strategies,
and the use of entities to obtain valuation discounts." Id.
153
The Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 20, at 1117. Although probate is looked at with
disdain, Langbein argues that probate does solve three problems: (1) "title-clearing" of property so
that it becomes marketable again, (2) creditor protections, and (3) distribution as per the testator's
donative intentions. Id. Thus, while will substitutes have gained increasing favor, the "necessity"
of the standard will, and thereby the probate process, is still prevalent. Id.
154
Tritt, supra note 25, at 116.
155
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7. 1(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
152
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Will substitutes can "take a variety of forms, including gifts,... living
trusts, certain bank and securities accounts and life insurance policies."15 6 One
of the key differences between wills and will substitutes is that will substitutes
are generally not subject to the same formalities as wills. 15 7 Another key
difference is that while a will transfers ownership of probate property at death,
property subject to a will substitute is not probate property because, by utilizing
a will substitute, the owner no longer owns the property at death. 158 Essentially,
a will substitute effects a present transfer of a nonpossessory future interest, and
thus the enjoyment59of that possession, for the transferee, is deferred until the
transferor's death.
Most will substitutes developed because of one of three reasons: the
customary commitment to one's spouse and other family members, due to
contractual obligation between companies and their customers, or based on some
business formality and company-customer interactions.160 In the case of business
formalities, for example, individuals are required to complete a beneficiary
designation form to inform an insurance company of whom to pay the
proceeds.1 6 1 Finally, many individuals use will6 substitutes because of their
convenience, ease, and less arduous formalities. 1
B.

Common ACAB Entities

Use of certain corporate entities in estate planning like trusts,
closely-held family businesses, and charitable entities has long been an important
tool in the toolbox of any planner, particularly those representing high net worth
individuals. 163 1 summarize below some of the vehicles used commonly by those
individuals generally, and artists and entertainers specifically. I discuss industryspecific ACAB entities in Section IV.C below.
1. Grantor Trusts
A grantor trust is one in which the creator of the trust, or the settlor or
grantor, transfers propery to herself as trustee and retains full control over the
156

GARY ET AL., supra note 70, at 8.

157

Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §

7.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("To be valid, a will substitute need not be executed in compliance
with the statutory formalities for a will because a will substitute is not a will.").
158
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
159
Id.
160

GARY ET AL., supra note 70, at 172.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

See Alexander & Klemmer, supranote 152; see also Tritt, supra note 25, at 179-80.
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property in the trust. 16 4 A grantor trust can be irrevocable or revocable. In the
latter case, the Internal Revenue Code taxes grantors on the trust income of those
trusts because the grantor is deemed to exert sufficient incidents of control over
owner of the assets despite
the assets to, in effect, still be the legal and beneficial
65
retitling the trust in the name of the trustee.'
166
2. Asset Protection Trusts

An asset protection trust ("APT") is a spendthrift trust created and
maintained either in a foreign jurisdiction ("offshore APT") or under state law
("DAPT"). 167 A spendthrift trust prevents a beneficiary's creditors from reaching
unless and until trust income or
assets held in trust for the beneficiary's benefit
168
principal is distributed to the beneficiary.
Wealthy individuals who utilize APTs generally prefer to set up offshore
accounts because domestic spendthrift trusts, especially self-settled ones, do not
provide sufficient protection against the claims of creditors. 169 Favorite locales
Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin
include: Anguilla, the Bahamas, Barbados,
170
Islands, and the Cayman Islands.
Generally, the settlor of an offshore APT will not retain any control over
the trust, the trust terminates on a future date-certain, and a foreign trust company
or financial institution serves as the trustee (not the settlor). 171 Assets so held are
generally beyond the jurisdiction of American courts and foreign jurisdictions do
not enforce American judgments in their countries. 172 As of September 2016, 17
states recognize DAPTs in some form.173

164

GARY ET AL., supra note 70, at 727-28.

26 U.S.C. §§ 671-677 (2015).
See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent
FinancialPlanning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REv. 147 (2007)
(describing the benefits and drawbacks of offshore trusts and various attempts through judicial
scrutiny to limit offshore asset protection). Note, even if Congress ultimately excepts certain
ACABs from statutory termination, given the considerable concerns regarding the propriety of
APTs (and the type of assets they generally hold), APTs are not likely to be among those excepted.
167
Id. at 150-52.
165

166

Id.
169
Id. at 152.
170
Id. Others include the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Mauritius,
Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
171
Id. at 153-54.
168

172

Id. at 154.

173
The following states enacted DAPT provisions: Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, Ohio,
Delaware, Missouri, Alaska (the first state to enact DAPT legislation), Wyoming, Rhode Island,
New Hampshire, Hawaii, Utah, Virginia, Oklahoma, Colorado, West Virginia, and Mississippi.

See generallyACTEC COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST STATUTES (David
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3. Closely-Held Business Entities
Family limited partnerships ("FLPs"), 174 family limited liability
companies ("FLLCs"), and S-corporations are commonly used to achieve
optimum asset protection and wealth maximization strategies. 175 FLPs and
FLLCs in particular are two of the most popular estate planning and wealth
maximization tools among practitioners. 176 These closely-held businesses are
often used in addition to-rather than instead of-trusts. 177 When successfully
created, funded, and managed these corporate structures are extremely successful
asset protection and wealth management tools for wealthy individuals,
generally,
78
and financially successful artists and entertainers in particular.
4. Charitable Entities
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal
income taxation certain entities organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, educational, or certain other purposes and that satisfy various
additional requirements.179 Common charitable vehicles include charitable
foundations, charitable trusts, and transfers to third-party charitable
beneficiaries.
High net worth individuals often include in a comprehensive estate plan
charitable donations of money and property, including intellectual property, for
a host of beneficial philanthropic, tax, and financial reasons. In many instances,
these transfers could be categorized as an ACAB transfer that is subject to a
Statutory Heir's termination rights.
V.

COMMON ACAB ENTITIES IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

Entertainers across all entertainment sectors often set up loan out
corporations to protect their assets and to secure certain tax benefits and music
publishing companies to own and administer their musical composition ("MC")

G. Shaftel et al. eds., 2016), http://www.actec.org/assets/l/6/Shaftel-Comparison-of-theDomestic-Asset-Protection-Trust-Statutes.pdf.
174

FLPs are businesses formed and funded by family members. See Eric Atstupenas, Using

FamilyLimited Partnershipsin Estate Tax Planning,60 R.I. B.J., May-June 2012, at 21.

175
See Alexander & Klemmer, supra note 152, at 311 (explaining that closely-held entities are
helpful and desirable to leverage what the authors call "wealth shifting"); Atstupenas, supra note
174, at 21.

176

See Alexander & Klemmer, supra note 152, at 316.

177

Seeid. at 311.

See id. at 316-17 ("Despite vigorous, increased IRS attacks on FLPs and FLLCs, they
remain an important component of advanced wealth transfer and asset protection planning.").
179
26U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015).
178
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copyrights. Entertainers often transfer existing copyrights to these industry-

specific ACAB entities. They may also create future works as an employee of
the company on a work-for-hire basis.1 80 However, these transfers to the
company, like any transfer except for those made by will, are subject to Statutory
Heir termination.
A. Loan-Out Company Formation
A loan-out company (usually formed as a corporation or limited liability

company) is set up as a separate and legal entity usually for an actor, recording
artist, or other individual for the purposes of using the loan-out company's
81
corporate legal protection.'
Entertainers set up loan-out corporations as a way to protect their assets
and obtain certain tax benefits. 82 The entertainer-an actor, for instance-is an
"employee" of the loan out corporation.18 3 The corporation enters into contracts
with third-party employers like a production company and then "loans out" the
184
services of the actor to the production company.
While there are few differences between studio employers employing an
artist through a loan-out company and employing the artist outright, artists may
have more of his or her intellectual property and financial interests protected by
utilizing a loan-out company. 185 Accordingly, due to its prevalence in the
entertainment industry, this part will focus on the three common contracts

180

Section 101 of the Copyright Act (title 17 of the U.S. Code) defines a "work made for hire"

as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose
of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as
a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing,
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use
of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts,
tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies,
appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic
work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities.
181 See Prince, supra note 21.
182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Robert C. Lind & Zeina Hamzeh, Use of Loan-Out Corporations in the Entertainment

Industry, 17 ANDREWS ENT. INDus. LITIG. REP. 1 (2006).
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utilized to create a loan-out arrangement, the general benefits of the corporate
186
form, and the considerable tax advantages of using a loan-out company.
1. Common Contracts Utilized to Create a Loan-Out Arrangement
Generally, a loan-out arrangement requires that three contracts be
executed. 187 These contracts include an employment agreement, a lending
agreement, and an inducement agreement. 188 The corporation and artist enter into
the employment agreement. 8 9 In most cases, the corporation is wholly owned by
an artist and the entity's sole function is to "loan-out" the artist's services to other
entertainment industry employers. 190 The loan-out company designates the artist
as its employee, and in some instances, the artist may even transfer intellectual
property rights to the corporation.' 91 This agreement allows the corporation to
lend the artist's services or license the artist's work and to receive compensation
paid for the artist's services. 192 In turn, the corporation-not the employer-pays
93
the artist's salary, expenses, and provides a range of employment benefits. 1
Third-party employers and the loan-out company enter into the lending
agreement to enable the loan-out company to "lend" the services of the artist to
the employer. 94 This contract exists independently from the employment
agreement and contains its own contractual obligations and rights. The terms
generally provide that the third party receive the services and intellectual
property as if it had entered into a direct, contractual relationship with the
artist. 195 By contracting with the loan-out company instead of the artist directly,

186
Entertainment figures are not the only ones to use such corporate forms to protect their
intellectual property and financial interests. For example, Tiger Woods transferred his trademark
and other interests into his privately-held corporation, ETW Corp. (which carries his initials). See
generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing Tiger Woods's
transfer of trademark and other rights to his privately-held corporation for marketing
paraphernalia).
187

THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL.,

1 ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BuSINESS

PRACTICES § 8.31 (3d ed. 2014).
188

Id.

189

Id.

190
191

See Moss & Basin, supra note 45, at 72.
SELZ ET AL., supra note 187.

192

Id.

193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Id.
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the employer avoids having to pay FICA, 196 state payroll taxes, and liability
insurance. 197
Finally, the third-party employer and the artist enter into an inducement
agreement. 198 This agreement binds the artist to personally guarantee she will be
bound to the terms of the lending agreement, even if the loan-out company
1 99
breaches the lending agreement.
2. The Benefits of the Corporate Form
Utilizing the corporate form allows an artist to take advantage of limited
personal liability and beneficial tax treatment. 200 Limiting personal liability
prevents a third party from reaching an artist's personal assets to satisfy the loanout company's obligations. 20 1 Thus, artists can successfully distinguish
themselves from the corporation.20 2
Like other areas of corporate law, the court will sometimes "pierce the
corporate veil" to hold the artist personally liable to prevent fraud, protect third
persons, prevent injustice, or other equitable considerations.2 3 However, as
mentioned above, any issue that may arise is generally offset by having the
artist's personal guarantee of the loan-out company's. obligations via an
inducement agreement.20 4

196
Federal Insurance Contributions Act, or FICA, is a United States federal payroll (or
employment) tax imposed on both employees and employers to fund Social Security and
Medicare-federal programs that provide benefits for retirees, the disabled, and children of
deceased workers. Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES
(Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes.
197
SELZ ET AL., supra note 187.
198

Id.

Caution is recommended when drafting and signing the inducement agreement, so as to only
guarantee the artist's personal obligations, not the entire duties and obligations of the loan-out
company. See id.
200
See Moss & Basin, supra note 45, at 72.
199

See id.
202
The most well-known example involves Kim Basinger (an "A List" movie star at that time),
Main Line Pictures, and the movie Boxing Helena. See e.g., Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger,
No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244, at *I (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994) (holding that Basinger was
a separate legal entity than her "loan-out company" and thus not liable to Main Line, even though
she was the single shareholder of the corporation).
203
See Lind & Hamzeh, supra note 185, at 2.
204
Jeffrey K. Eisen & Allan E. Biblin, Estate Planningfor Clients in the Entertainment
Business, 33 EST. PLAN. 26, 27 (2006). Although there are a variety of corporate forms, the most
commonly utilized form for a loan-out entity is an S corporation. S corporations are used over C
corporations for four primary reasons: (1) To avoid the problems associated with "zeroing out" a
C corporation at year-end; (2) To prevent double taxation; (3) To avoid personal holding company
tax; and (4) To allow the pass-through of foreign tax credit to the artist. Id.
201
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20 5
3. Tax Advantages of Using a Loan-Out Company

An artist enjoys numerous tax advantages by utilizing a loan-out
company. For example, an artist can defer income, set up her own pension plan,
and maximize the deductibility of expenses.20 6 By utilizing the loan-out
company, the artist also avoids an employer/employee relationship with the
production or record label. 20 7 The loan-out company is paid the gross contract
amount without wage withholdings, which would otherwise be withheld if the
artist was an employee. 208 Before loan-out companies became a viable and
preferred alternative, artists tried to distinguish themselves from the corporate
interest-holders as independent contractors, and the IRS pushed back forcefully
against such arguments. 20 9 However, by using the loan-out company, the artist
avoids this issue almost entirely.210
Additionally, loan-out companies provide for greater flexibility in
pension plans. The loan-out company can itself create a pension plan, sheltering
21
some of the artist's income. 21 Conversely, if the artist was an employee of the
studio, she would be subject to the studio's pension plan (generally limited to an
individual retirement account).212 Setting up the pension plan through the loanout company also allows the artist to borrow up to $50,000, which is different
than self-employed individual's pension plans.213
Furthermore, loan-out companies can deduct medical and insurance
costs, as well as the costs of life insurance and disability insurance. 214 Neither an
employee nor self-employed artist could do S0.215 In addition, the corporation
can deduct itemized miscellaneous expenses under the Internal Revenue Code

As with most corporations, there are certain drawbacks that an artist must be careful to either
avoid, or address appropriately; namely (1) falling within Internal Revenue Code section 269A;
(2) personal holding company tax penalties; and (3) income-withholding taxes in foreign countries.
See Lind & Hamzeh, supra note 185, at 5.
See id. at 3.
206
207
See id.
208
See id.
205

209

See id. at 4.

See id. I say "almost" entirely because occasionally the IRS has invalidated loan-out
companies and determined the artist to be an employee.
210

213

See id.
See id.
See id.

214

See id.

215

See id.

211
212
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without limit. 216 While employees can deduct only expenses that exceed 2% of
the employee's adjusted gross income, a corporation can deduct 100%.217
Finally, a loan-out company can defer income to the next fiscal year like
other personal service corporations. 218 The corporation's income is paid out as a
bonus to the shareholder (i.e. artist).219 While there are certain restrictions,2 2 ° the
benefit still is evident. A loan-out company provides many tax advantages. From
the classification of employee status, to pension plans, deductions, and deferral
of income, utilizing a loan-out company can readily benefit an artist from the
constraints of a typical employee relationship.
Overall, loan-out companies have both identifiable benefits and
drawbacks. While there may not be a realistic difference from the hiring party's
point of view between employing an artist directly or through her loan-out
company, this "middle man" can be useful in maximizing the benefits the artist
receives. Creating a loan-out company may add another "layer" to an already
complex estate plan, but if effectively created during the artist's life, it can
adequately accomplish the artist's wishes after death, generally. However, when
the loan-out company holds copyrights transferred to it by the artist (instead of
copyrights created on a work-for-hire basis in the context of employment), the
artist's transfers are susceptible to Statutory Heir terminations.
B. Music Publishing Companies
A music publishing company owns MC copyrights or administers the
MC copyrights owned by an individual or independent music publisher.2 21 Music
publishing companies serve a critical function in the recording industry, and only
a few major music publishing companies exist. However, hundreds of
independent publishing companies, and individual songwriters who administer
their own MCs, also exist.222
As singer-songwriters and other composers learned that revenues
generated by exploiting MC copyrights can be considerable (far more than album
sales or performance fees), recording artists are far more likely now to create
their own publishing companies, maintain control over their publishing, and
either administer their catalogs themselves, enter into administration deals with

216
217

See id.
See id.

See id.
See id.
220
The fiscal year must end in either September, October, or November, and the corporation
must pay the shareholder (artist) compensation by December 31 each year.
221
SELZET AL., supra note 187, § 1:49.
218
219

222

Id.
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a larger music publisher, or enter into a co-publishing deal with a major music
publisher.223
C. Celebrity Family Office
The Celebrity Family Office is another business vehicle high net-worth
entertainers and athletes use to protect and maximize wealth.224 The celebrity
family office is based on the more general multi-family office.225 The structure
allows a celebrity to combine into one entity the core activities of a business
226
manager's job with a wide range of financial and legal planning and expertise.
There are two types of family offices: single family and multi-family.227
A single-family office manages the financial and business affairs of just one
family. 228 In contrast, a multi-family office manages the financial and business
affairs of several different families. Both offer a range of services that can be
grouped into two basic categories: wealth management (e.g., investment
management, advanced planning, and private investment banking) and family
support (e.g., administrative and lifestyle services). 22 9 Each category is further
divided into a range of specific products and services. Each is separately
available in the marketplace. But celebrities can leverage the Celebrity Family
Office and maximize financial and tax benefits by housing all of the varied
products and services under one proverbial roof.23°
In conclusion, given the prevalence and importance of these corporate
forms in the entertainment industry-an industry that generates a substantial
amount of copyrighted material-Congress must address and reconcile the
unintended incongruent treatment of nonprobate ACAB transfers and pure
testamentary transfers.

Id.; see also TONYA EvANS-WALLS, CONTRACTS COMPANION FOR WRITERS 63-65 (2007).
See Russ Alan Prince, The Growing Appeal of the Celebrity Family Office, FORBES (May
224
26, 2016, 6:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2016/05/26/the-growing-appealof-the-celebrity-family-office/#4b27cdffa965.
223

225

Russ Alan Prince, What Is a Celebrity Multi-Family Office?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2013, 6:14

http://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2013/10/15/the-celebrity-multi-familyAM),
office/#5f7986844104.
226

Id.

227

Russ Alan Prince, What is a Family Office?, FORBES (May 22, 2013, 6:39 AM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2013/05/22/what-is-a-family-office/#2563cae91038.
228

Id.

229

Id.

230

Id.
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VI. TRANSFER TERMINATION CASES INVOLVING STATUTORY HEIRS

The initial section 203 termination right trigger date occurred on January
1, 2013. Therefore, cases litigating the various issues related to section 203
termination are just starting to make their way onto lawyers' desks, and they will
eventually make their way through the legal system. Ray CharlesFoundation v.
Robinson231 is the first case to highlight the reality of a 203 Statutory Heir's right
to effect a testamentary-scheme defeating termination. 2 Therefore, that case
provides important insight into the concerns I raise in this Article about, and need
for, protection of ACAB transfers.
A.

Ray Charles Foundation v. Robinson
The Ninth Circuit recently heard Ray Charles Foundation v.

Robinson.a3 3 That case presents facts analogous to the problem my proposed

amendment seeks to resolve; that is, when a Statutory Heir asserts a termination
interest clearly contrary to the decedent author's testamentary wishes. In that
case, Ray Charles named his private charitable foundation as sole heir of his
rights and recipient of his royalties during his life and thereafter.234 The
Foundation is totally funded by the royalties and is prohibited from receiving any
other means of support.235 Charles negotiated with his twelve children to waive
any right to his estate in exchange for half a million dollars into an irrevocable
trust for each.236 He died before the transfer termination window opened.23 7 The
perfect storm.
After his death, seven children served dozens of termination notices on
various transferees and the Foundation sued challenging the termination
notices. 238 The issue was whether the Foundation had standing to sue. 239 The

231
232

795 F.3d 1109(9th Cir. 2015).
Another recent case examines a pre-1978 transfer that involved a revised contract, which
triggered applicability of 203. Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2015). In
that case, the Statutory Heirs sought a declaratory judgment from the court to affirm that their
copyright termination notice was valid and enforceable. If valid and enforeceable, the notice would
effectively terminate the grantee's copyright in the song. Id.
233
See Ray CharlesFound., 795 F.3d at 1109.
234
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112-13.
Id. at 1113 (noting that the Terminating Heirs filed 39 termination "notices under § 203 and
§ 304(c) to terminate pre- and post-1978 grants authorized by Charles" to various transferees,
including Warner/Chappell).
235

236
237
238

239

Id. at 1114-15.
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Ninth Circuit held that it did.2 40 If the Foundation is successful ultimately on the
merits, the transferee, Warner Chappell, will remain in control of the copyrights
and the Foundation will continue to be funded. Ray Charles's wishes and intent
will survive. If, however, the terminating Statutory Heirs are successful,
Charles's testamentary scheme will be decimated.
This case serves as a stark example of how Statutory Heirs may receive
an unintended and undue benefit when they inherit an author's termination right
when the artist dies before the termination window opens. Therefore, all author
copyright transfers to ACAB vehicles and entities that serve the artist's overall
estate plan and testamentary scheme should be excepted in the same way that
testamentary transfers by will are protected.
B.

Section 304 "Guidepost" Cases

Although copyright transfers made on or after January 1, 1978, entered
into the transfer termination window as of January 1, 2013, and are governed by
the 1976 version of the Act, the 1909 version of the Act is still relevant for
renewal right transfers made before 1978 as they are still subject to section
304(d). 241 Therefore, cases involving 304(d) terminations are illustrative.
The following cases are prominent Statutory Heir transfer termination
cases decided in the last 10 years. This curated list of cases from various sectors
of the entertainment industry show the prevalence of such terminations
regardless of the type of creative work. Some cases do not directly involve
terminations of ACAB transfers. However, all of these cases highlight
Congress's likely intent in permitting Statutory Heirs to exercise a deceased
author's termination right.
242
1. Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog,Inc.

In the 1930s, J. Fred Coots and Haven Gillespie jointly composed the
Christmas classic Santa Claus is Comin'to Town.243 Coots and Gillespie sold the
song's copyright to EMI's predecessor, Leo Feist, Inc., by agreement in 1934
("1934 Agreement"). 4 4 Although most authors during that time "sold their rights
in the initial term and renewal term simultaneously, Coots granted his renewal

Id. at 1119-22.
See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), (d) (2015); see also Allison M. Scott, Oh Bother: Milne, Steinbeck,
and an Emerging CircuitSplit over the Alienability of Copyright Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 357, 358 (2007) ("Of the three termination provisions of the 1976 Act, § 304(c) and §
304(d) will continue to be employed for the next few decades to terminate [renewal] transfers made
before 1978." (citations omitted)).
805 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2015).
242
243
Id. at 19.
244
Id. at 19-20.
240
241
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rights" by separate agreement in 1951 ("1951 Agreement").24 5 Feist renewed its
copyright in 1961 and the rights were set to expire in 1990.246
In 1981, Coots sent a termination notice ("1981 Termination Notice")
for the 1951 Agreement to Feist's successor, Robbins Music Corporation
("Robbins").24 7 Coots filed a copy of the 1981 Termination Notice with the
Copyright Office and entered into an agreement with Robbins ("1981
Agreement").24 8 That agreement both conveyed the rights and represented and
warranted that Coots served Robbins with a termination notice to Robbins and
recorded the same in the Copyright Office.249
After Congress enacted the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Coots's Statutory Heirs sought to take advantage of the 304(d)
termination right granted to them.
In 2004, they served EMI (Robbin's
successor-in-interest) with notice of termination ("2004 Termination Notice")
and recorded the same with the Copyright Office. 251 The heirs sent notice
believing EMI still owned the rights under the 1951 Agreement and that Coots
had never exercised his termination rights under section 304(c).252 Assuming that
the 1981 Agreement was operative, EMI searched the copyright records for a
copy termination notice, but after finding nothing, entered into negotiations with
Coots's heirs.253
EMI and the Statutory Heirs agreed that "in light of the 1981 Agreement,
EMI's rights in the [songs] were more appropriately terminated under Section
203.254 Accordingly, in 2007, the Statutory Heirs served and recorded a second
termination notice ("2007 Termination Notice"), which indicated that the 1981
Agreement would terminate pursuant to section 203.255 Mr. Coots' attorney then
attempted to negotiate the sale of the "to-be-terminated" rights back to EMI, but
those negotiations fell through.256

245

Id. at 20.

246

Id.

247

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. Oddly and without explanation, on May 26, 1982, Coots's attorney received a letter from

248
249

the Copyright Office stating that "[p]ursuant to our telephone conversation on March 1, 1982, we
are returning [the 1981 Agreement] to you unrecorded." Id. at 23. Coots's attorney stated he could
not recall what had transpired in the telephone conversation referenced in the letter. Id. Ultimately,
the court held that the notice was never recorded. Id.

253

Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.

254

Id.

255

Id.
Id.

250
251
252

256
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Two years later, in 2009, Warner-Chappell Music, copyright
administrator for a Coots family venture, wrote to EMI claiming control of the
copyright in the song under the 2004 Termination Notice. 7 EMI asserted that
its copyright "ha[d] not been and could not be terminated" because Coots had
already exercised his section 304(c) termination via the 1981 Agreement. 8
In 2012, the Statutory Heirs served and recorded a third termination
notice ("2012 Termination Notice"), which cited section 203, not section 304(d),
as the source of the heirs' right to terminate.25 9 Further, the 2012 Termination
Notice assumed that the 2007 Termination Notice was premature, on the theory
that the 1981 Agreement was a grant only of the right to publish the work and
nothing else.260 Under that theory, the 1981 Agreement could not be terminated
until 2021 (40 years after transfer). 61
The Statutory Heirs then filed a declaratory action, seeking a judgment
that the 2007 Termination Notice would terminate EMI's rights in 2016, or,
alternatively, that the 2012 Termination Notice would terminate EMI's rights in
202 1.262 "Following discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment,"
and the district court granted EMI's motion and denied that of Coots's heirs.263
The court held that since the 1981 Termination Notice was never recorded, EMI
controlled the rights in the song under the 1951 Agreement, which is not
terminable under section 203.264
Further, the court concluded that section 304(d) was unavailable to the
Statutory Heirs because "[p]laintiffs exercised their section 304(c) termination
rights when they served the 1981 Notice on EMI and secured a substantial
$100,000 bonus payment., 265 As such, the district court concluded that EMI's
rights would actually survive until 2029.266
In 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was essentially tasked with
determining what agreement, if any, was the controlling document, and what
legal effect that determination had on prior agreements.267 On appeal, the first
question the court considered was whether EMI owns its rights in the song under
the 1951 Agreement or the 1981 Agreement. 268 The Statutory Heirs argued that

257

Id.

258

260

Id.
Id.
Id.

261

Id.

262

Id. at 25.

263

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

259

264
265
266
267
268
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the 1981 Agreement superseded the 1951 Agreement and, upon doing so, became
the operative source of EMI's rights.269 In rebuttal, EMI argued that the 1981
Agreement did not supersede the 1951 Agreement, and that the failure of Coots
to record the 1981 Termination Notice rendered the 1951 Agreement the
operative agreement. 270
The court found EMI's argument unpersuasive, finding that the 1981
Agreement not only granted EMI the future interest scheduled to revert to Coots,
it also replaced the 1951 Agreement as the source of EMI's rights. 271 The court
concluded that the parties to the 1981 Agreement clearly manifested an intention
to replace the former 1951 Agreement, as opposed to merely granting Coots's
future interest. 272 The court was persuaded by the plain language of the 1981
Agreement, which stated that Coots was also granting "all rights and interests...
heretofore... acquired or possess[ed] by [him] ... under any and all renewals
and extensions.,, 273 As such, the court found that the 1981 Agreement effectively
replaced the 1951 Agreement.2 74 The court found it would defy logic to have two
grants of the same exact rights be operative at the same time. 275 Lastly, Coots's
failure to record the 1981 Termination Notice was irrelevant to the question of
whether EMI presently owns the copyright under the 1951 or 1981 Agreement.2 76
The court concluded that the 1981 Agreement was the source of EMI's
rights in the song and could be terminated under section 203 in 2016.277
Accordingly, the 2007 Termination Notice terminated the 1981 Agreement at
that time.27 8
2 79
2. Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger,Inc.

In 1930, Alan Alexander Milne ("author"), author of the Winnie the
Pooh children's books, granted various rights to Stephen Slesinger, who
subsequently transferred those rights to a corporation he controlled, Stephen
Slesinger, Inc. ("SSI",).28 ° The author died testate in 1956, survived by his widow

269

Id.

270

273

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.

274

Id. at 29.

275

Id.

276

Id. at 31.

277

Id. at 31-32.

278

279

Id. at 32.
430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).

280

Id. at 1039.

271
272
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and son, Christopher Milne. 28 l Author's will bequeathed all beneficial interests
in the Pooh works to a trust for the benefit of his widow during her lifetime
("Milne Trust"), and, after her death, in further trust for other beneficiaries
("Pooh Properties Trust"). 8 2 Christopher and Christopher's daughter,
Clare,
283
were among the named beneficiaries of the Pooh Properties Trust.
In 1961, SSI granted to Walt Disney Productions ("Disney") the
exclusive rights it acquired pursuant to the 1930 Agreement.28 4 Simultaneously,
Disney entered into a similar agreement with author's widow and the Milne Trust
in order to acquire other exclusive rights. 28 5 The author's widow died in 1971,
28 6
and the remaining Milne Trust corpus was added to the Pooh Properties Trust.
Five years later, the 1976 Act added an author's termination right to the Act.28 7
In 1983, faced with the threat that Christopher may exercise his right to
terminate, Disney renegotiated a new and more lucrative deal with him. 288 This
new agreement specifically referenced and acknowledged the 1930 and 1961
Agreements and provided that the new agreement would effectively revoke the
prior agreements from 1930 and 1961 and re-grant the rights in the Pooh works
to SSI (who, in turn, granted various rights to Disney).28 9
In 2002, Christopher's daughter Clare sought to recapture rights to the
Pooh works.290 She served SSI with her notice of termination and entered into an
agreement with Disney to assign the rights she expected to reclaim. 291 She also
commenced a declaratory action in district court asking the court to recognize
her termination notice as valid.292 Clare argued that the 1983 Agreement was
merely an extension of the 1930 Agreement.293 Additionally, she argued that a
grantee could not simply contract around "the statutory rule against obtaining a
new grant prior to termination of the original grant" unless and until there was at

281

Id. Milne granted Slesinger "exclusive merchandising and other rights based on the Pooh

works in the United States and Canada 'for and during the respective periods of copyright and of
any renewal thereof to be had under the Copyright Act[.]' Id. (citation omitted in original).
282
Id.
283
Id.
284

Id. at 1040.

285

Id.
Id.

286

Id.
Id. The Pooh Properties Trust "received double SSI's share of the royalties, compared to
about half of SSI's share before the 1983 agreement. Thus, the renegotiations between the parties
resulted.., in a net gain of hundreds of millions of dollars .... Id. at 1040-41.
289
Id. at 1040.
290
Id. at 1041.
287

288

291

Id.

292

Id.

293

Id.
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least a "'moment [of freedom]' when the grantor is bound under neither the prior
nor the new grant., 294 However, the court quickly dismissed this argument,
finding instead that a plain reading of section 304(c)(6)(d) sets clear guidelines
on the proper timing mechanism for grants and agreements.295
SSI argued that Clare's termination notice was invalid because the 1930
grant of rights at the heart of the termination notice had already been revoked by
the 1983 agreement, and as such, could not be the subject of termination.29 6 Both
the district court and, ultimately, the Ninth Circuit agreed.2 97
The district court held that the 1983 Agreement revoked the grants under
the 1930 Agreement and the grant made to SSI via the 1983 Agreement was,
therefore, not subject to tennination.298 That court reasoned further that the
termination provisions apply only to grants made prior to 1978, and that the
Copyright Act did not alter the power of private parties to contract. 99 Clare's
argument that the 1983 Agreement was an extension of the 1930 Agreement was
also unpersuasive.3 °°
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether the 1983 Agreement was an
"agreement to the contrary" pursuant to section 304(c)(5). The Act does not
define the term. 30 1 The court held the 1983 Agreement to be easily
distinguishable and not contemplated by the legislative history.30 2 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit held that the 1983 Agreement revoked and replaced the 1930
Agreement, and as such, the 1983 Agreement was controlling and nonterminable.30 3
3.

30 4

DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures Corp.

This 2013 case, also from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, addresses
the effect a post-1978 agreement ("1992 Agreement") has on termination30 5rights
pursuant to an author's prior agreement from 1938 ("1938 Agreement").

294

Id. at 1042.

295

Id. at 1047-48.

296

Id. at 1047.

297

Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1042-43. The court further stated that the 1983 Agreement "was created in order to

298

299

protect SSI and Disney from a termination of the rights granted to them." Id. at 1042.
300
Id. at 1041-42.
301
Id. at 1043.
302
Id.at 1044.
303

Id.

304

545 F. App'x 678 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 680.

305

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119

In 2003, Mark Peary, the executor of the estate of Joseph Shuster (one
of the two co-creators of Superman), filed a copyright termination notice
("Termination Notice") pursuant to section 304(d), seeking to reclaim the
copyrights to Superman that Shuster had assigned to DC Comics ("DC") in
1938.306 In response, DC sought a declaratory judgment that the estate's
Termination Notice was ineffective.30 7 DC argued that the 1992 Agreement,
signed with Joseph Shuster's siblings (including his sister and sole heir, Jean
Peavy) granted the siblings pensions for life in exchange for a revocation of the
1938 Agreement of copyrights to DC and a re-grant of all of Shuster's copyrights
in Superman, effectively revoking and replacing the 1938 Agreement.30 8 The
court agreed with this assertion, as the plain text of the 1992 Agreement, which
states that it "'fully settles all claims' regarding 'any copyrights, trademarks, or
other property right in any and all work created in whole or in part by... Joseph
Shuster,' and further 'now grant[s] to [DC] any such rights,"' superseded the
1938 Agreement as a matter of law.30 9
The executor argued that the 1992 Agreement did not expressly cancel
the 1938 Agreement. 310 The court dismissed this argument based on New York
precedent stating that in deciding whether one agreement supersedes another the
focus is on the intent of the parties to supplement or to supplant the prior
agreement. 311 The executor also argued that the 1992 Agreement could not
foreclose the Termination Notice because it is an "agreement to the contrary"
within the meaning of section 304(d).3 12 The court found this contention to be in
direct conflict with the plain text of the copyright termination statute, in that it
would permit the copyright termination provision to nullify a post-1977
assignment, "despite the statute's express limitation to assignments 'executed
before January 1, 1978. ,,313 The Court cited its decision in Milne to show that
the estate's contention would conflict with the legislative history and
congressional intent underlying these provisions parties to have the free right to
contract.314

306

Id.

307

Id.

Id. These facts are more analogous to Ray Charles Foundationbecause heirs in that case
also contractually agreed to certain benefits in exchange for releasing any rights to exploit the
copyright.
309
Id. at 680-81.
310
Id. at 680.
311
Id.
308

312
313

Id. at 681.
Id.

314
Id. at 681-82. Judge Sidney Runyan Thomas filed a lone dissenting opinion in this case. Id.
at 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He opined that the real question before the Court was "whether the
1992 Agreement was a novation that validly revoked and re-granted" Joseph Shuster's 1938
Agreement, which he found to not be the case. Id. at 683.
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4.

3 15
Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc.

Albert Brumley, Sr. ("Brumley, Sr.") was the composer of a popular gospel song,
I'll Fly Away.316 On September 15, 1932, the Hartford Music Company
("Hartford") secured the initial copyright in the song by publishing it in a
songbook.317 In the 1940s, Brumley, Sr. formed a music-publishing company,
Albert E. Brumley & Sons ("Brumley & Sons"), to own Brumley's copyrights.3 18
Eventually, he purchased all of Hartford's assets, including the song. 319 Brumley,
Sr. renewed the copyright registration in 1960 and he continued to control
all
320
company.
publishing
music
Sons
&
Brumley
the
through
song
the
to
rights
In December of 1975, Brumley, Sr. sold his interest in Brumley & Sons
to two of his children, William and Robert.32 1 Shortly thereafter, Brumley, Sr.
and his wife, Goldie, "executed a Bill of Sale that purported to" transfer, among
other personal property, copyrights listed in an attachment, "to William and
Robert., 322 It was undisputed that the list included the song at the heart of this
litigation.32 3
Brumley, Sr. died testate in 1977, survived by his wife, Goldie, and their
six children.324 Brumley, Sr. bequeathed all of his property, including his
interests in any copyrights, to Goldie.325 In May of 1979, Goldie executed
another Bill of Sale, wherein she maintained that she was the "sole and rightful
owner" of all of her late husband's songs and then purported to assign those
rights to Brumley & Sons.326 The agreement also conveyed to Brumley & Sons
the rights to renew copyrights for all rights therein.327 In 1986, Robert bought out

William's share of Brumley & Sons, leaving Robert as the sole owner when
Goldie died in 1988.328
In 2006, the other four Brumley children (Jackson, Albert, Betty, and
Thomas) delivered a notice of termination to Brumley & Sons purportedly to

315
316

727 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 575.

318

Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.

319

Id.

320

Id.

321

Id.

322

Id.

323

Id.

324

Id.

325

Id.

326

Id.

327

Id.
Id.

317

328
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terminate the 1975 transfer of rights from Brumley, Sr. to William and Robert.32 9
When Robert refused to330recognize the validity of the termination notice, the
Brumley heirs filed suit.
At trial, Robert argued that the termination notice was invalid for two
reasons. First, he contended that Goldie exercised her termination rights by
assigning her rights in the 1979 Bill of Sale, which would serve to prevent the
Brumley heirs from later attempting to exercise those same rights.33 ' Second,
Robert argued that Brumley, Sr. was an employee of the Hartford Music
company at the time that he created the song, and as such, that song should be
declared a "work made for hire," thus placing
it outside the purview of the
332
termination provisions of the Copyright Act.
The district court held that Goldie's 1979 Bill of Sale did not constitute
an exercise of termination rights and recognized the validity of the Brumley
heirs' termination notice.333 Robert then filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking
appellate review of the district court's determination.334 On appeal the appeals
court found that the district court erred in excluding items from evidence, and,
therefore, never addressed the termination issue raised by Robert.335
5.

336
ClassicMedia, Inc. v. Mewborn

In 2008, the Ninth Circuit heard Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn and

analyzed whether a transfer termination right can be extinguished by a post- 1978
re-grant of the same rights previously assigned before 1978. 337 The Ninth Circuit
held it did not and viewed a contrary result as inconsistent with the congressional
intent underlying the Copyright Act.338

330

Id.
Id.

331

Id.

329

Id. The district court made some pre-trial evidentiary rulings that, although peripheral to the
focus of this memorandum, effectively served to stifle the court's ability to answer the relevant
question concerning the Termination Notice. Id. at 577. The district court bifurcated the trial based
upon the evidentiary issues raised, and held a jury trial for the purpose of determining whether
Brumley, Sr.'s song was a "work made for hire" in pursuance of the statute. The jury concluded
that Brumley, Sr. was the statutory author of the song, meaning that it was not made for hire and
that Brumley, Sr.'s heirs would have termination rights under section 304(d). Id.
332

333

Id.

334 Id.
335
Id. at 580.
336
532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
337
338

Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
Id. at 979-80.
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Eric Knight, author of Lassie Come Home (the "Lassie Works"),
published and registered the Lassie Works in the Copyright Office in 1940. 33 9
Knight granted television rights to Classic Media, Inc.'s ("Classic") predecessorin-interest, but Knight died in 1943 before the renewal rights had vested.3 4' After
Knight's passing, the interest in the renewal term of the copyrights passed to
Knight's wife, Ruth, and their three daughters: Jennie Moore, Betty Myers, and
Winifred Mewbom ("Mewborn"). 341 Classic's predecessor-in-interest only had
an agreement in place with Knight's widow, so it had to secure agreements with
Knight's daughters to secure the renewal term of motion picture, television, and
radio rights.342
In 1976, Mewbom assigned her 25% share in the Lassie Works to Lassie
Television, Inc. ("LTI") via written agreement ("1976 Agreement").343
Mewborn, however, was the only one to assign her interest at that time.344 LTI
was not able to obtain similar assignments from the other sisters until 1978.
To make the individual grant of rights among the sisters equally, Mewbom
signed a second agreement ("1978 Agreement") which contained the identical
transfer of rights as the 1976 Assignment.3 46 This agreement, albeit identical to
those signed by her sisters in every other way, also granted some ancillary rights
to LTI and contained the following language:
[a]ll of the foregoing rights are granted to [LTI] throughout the
world in perpetuity, to the extent such rights are owned by me,
as hereinafter provided... [t]he rights granted herein to [LTI]
are in addition to the rights granted by me to [LTI] under and
pursuant to an assignment dated July 14, 1976 ....

339

Id. at 980.

340

Id.

341

Id.
,Id.

342

343

Id. The agreement stated, in pertinent part:
I, Winifred Knight Mewborn,... hereby sell, grant, and assign to [LTI] all of
the following rights in and to the story entitled LASSIE COME-HOME written
by Eric Knight and published in the Saturday Evening Post on December 17,

1938 and the novel or book based thereon also written by Eric Knight and
published by John C. Winston Co. in 1940 ....
All motion picture (including musical motion picture), television and radio
rights in and to the said literary work[s] ... throughout the world for the full
period of the renewal copyrights in the work[s] and any further renewals or
extensions thereof.
Id.
344
345
346

347

Id.
Id.
Id. at 980-81.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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In 1996, Mewborn served a notice of termination on Palladium Limited
Partnership ("Palladium"), LTI's then successor-in-interest in the Lassie Works,
in an attempt to recapture her rights by terminating the 1976 Agreement.3 48 This
notice purported to terminate the 1976 Agreement effective May 1, 1998. 349
On April 1, 1998, counsel for LTI's then successor-in-interest, Golden
Books Family Entertainment, by letter, rejected and repudiated Mewbom's
termination notice.350 Later, in 2004, Mewborn discovered that Classic was
preparing to produce a motion picture based upon her father's Lassie Works, and
Mewbom's counsel subsequently wrote to Classic demanding payment for
Classic's exploitation of the Lassie motion picture. 351 That letter served as the
impetus for this case.352 Classic filed a declaratory action requesting a judgment
that Mewbom had no interest in the Lassie film or any of the rights she previously
assigned from the 1978 Agreement and that her termination notice was
ineffective.353 Mewbom then counterclaimed, arguing that Mewbom had, in fact,
recaptured some of her previously assigned rights.354 Both parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment.3 55
On February 9, 2006, the district court granted Classic's motion for
summary judgment and denied Mewborn's motion as moot.356 The district court
interpreted the termination right under section 304(c) to be inalienable but
subject to waiver or relinquishment, and found that the parties intended the 1978
Agreement to "give away" all of Mewbom's additional rights that were not
assigned via the 1976 Agreement, including her newly acquired right to
terminate under section 304.357 Therefore, the court concluded that Mewbom had
relinquished her termination right, and deemed the Notice of Termination
ineffective. 358 Further, the district court found that the 1978 Agreement did not
substitute or revoke the 1976 Agreement, and that the 1976 Agreement was still
intact.359 Mewborn appealed.36 °
The Ninth Circuit was quick to disagree with the district court's assertion
that "the only reasonable interpretation of the 1978 contract language is that
348

Id. at 981.

349
350

Id.
Id.

351

Id.

352

Id.

353

Id.

354 Id.
355 Id.at 982.
Id.
356
357
358

Id.
Id.

359 Id.
360

Id.
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[Mewborn] intended to give away any additional... rights not given away in
1976, thus relinquishing her newly acquired right of termination., 361 The court
referenced the congressional intent leading to section 304(c) and noted that the
new renewal process was intended to give an author and his heirs a second
chance to benefit from the fruits of his labors.3 62 The court explained further that
copyrights, unlike other property rights, are incapable of being accurately valued
3 63
prior to the time they become exploited.
The court of appeals opined that the district court misrelied upon Milne
v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., finding it to be factually dissimilar.3 64 In discussing
Milne, the court noted that the author's heirs obtained considerably more money
through a renegotiated deal made with the impending possibility of one of the
heirs would exercise their right of termination.365 This renegotiated deal,
therefore, served the intended congressional purpose underlying the provisions,
allowing the heirs to benefit from the fruits of the author's labor, not a grantee.366
In differentiating the instant case from Milne, the court noted two major
factual discrepancies that played a role in its analysis. First, Milne had, and knew
that he had, the right to exercise his termination right as a means to leverage his
position for a better deal.367 Mewborn did not even have the option to serve notice
of her termination right for another six years, leaving Mewborn in no better
position to bargain. 36 s Secondly, the intended nature of the agreements in the
instant case compared to Milne were not the same. 369 In Milne, the post-1978
agreement expressly revoked the pre-1978 agreements and simultaneously regranted the same rights. 370 Mewbom's 1978 Agreement granted rights "in
addition to" the ones granted in the 1976 Agreement. 371 Further, the agreement
in Milne also stated expressly that it was made in exchange for the non-exercise

362

Id.
Id. at 982-83.

363

Id. at 983. The court noted that:

361

Congress enacted the inalienability of termination rights provision in [section]
304(c) [as a means] to resurrect the fundamental purpose underlying the twotiered structure of the duration of copyrights it originally adopted: to award to
the author, and not to the assignee of the right to exploit the copyright during
its initial term, the monetary rewards of a work that may have been initially
undervalued ....
Id.

367

Id. at 987.
Id. at 987-88.
Id. at 988.
Id. at 989.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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of the termination right.37 2 The 1978 Agreement in the instant case was silent on
the issue. 373 Finally, the court found no evidence that the termination right was
considered by either party in making the 1978 Agreement or that Mewbom was
even aware of her termination right.374 Accordingly, the court held that the 1978
explicitly affirm the 1976 Agreement and did not
Agreement merely served to 375
it.
replace
or
revoke,
modify,
The court found that Mewborn did not intend to relinquish a known
termination right, and the 1978 Agreement did not expressly or impliedly transfer
that right as to the 1976 Agreement. 376 As such, the court reversed the district
court decision and held the termination notice was valid and effective.377
VII. RECLAIMING TESTAMENTARY CONTROL OF COPYRIGHT

Congress created transfer termination rights to fully empower authors to
renegotiate from a position of strength. When authors do not live long enough to
reclaim their rights, Congress empowers Statutory Heirs to, in effect, step into
the shoes of the author and reclaim, renegotiate, or otherwise exploit the rights
instead. However, Congress was careful not to include testamentary transfers by
will so as not to disturb the author's testamentary freedom when the author made
some express disposition of copyright interests. Now that more and more authors
are using nonprobate vehicles in addition to wills (or instead of them) to
accomplish a comprehensive estate plan for business, financial, philanthropic
and other reasons, Congress must recognize the unintended consequence of
leaving such ACAB transfers at risk of termination by Statutory Heirs contrary
to an author's testamentary intent. Further, Congress must reconcile this
disparate treatment of wills and will substitutes and amend the Copyright Act to
balance an author's inter vivos and testamentary wishes with the policies
underlying the government's interest in protecting the welfare of the author's
closest heirs if the author dies before having the opportunity to exercise her
termination right.
Congress could empower authors to reclaim testamentary control of
ACAB transfers by, for example, excepting such transfers altogether from
termination by a Statutory Heir. Doing so would place ACAB transfers wholly
and rightfully on par with wills. Whether grounded in jurisprudential or

372

Id.

373

Id.

374

Id. The court further found that "if LTI had entered into the 1978 Assignment intending that

the termination right was on the bargaining table, the contract language fails to reflect this intention
or provide any consideration for that right." Id.
375 Id.
376

Id.

377

Id. at 990.
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pragmatic justifications,"' succession laws have and continue to be liberally
applied and construed to honor a testator's intent. Copyright holders should be
afforded the same opportunity at death as non-holders to determine the
disposition of copyright transfers; at least to the extent those transfers remain
under the control of the author and benefit the author as opposed to an armslength, third party transferee like a publishing company or distributor.
Alternatively, Congress could create a time-limited exception for all
lifetime ACAB transfers made within three years of entity formation. A threeyear time period is reasonable because: 1) such a time limit would cover most
transfers made by an artist to a loan-out company, publishing company, or
Celebrity Family Office, recognizing that all other copyrighted works would be
works-made-for-hire as long as the artist is an employee of the entity; and 2) it
is consistent with other "look back" rules in succession and tax law and the threeyear statute of limitations set forth in UPC section 3-108.
Absent a legislative fix, estate planning practitioners are severely limited
in their ability to protect a client's testamentary wishes to exploit rights during
the client's lifetime and to further estate planning goals for copyright interests,
which survive an author's death for 70 years, 379 to the extent the client's wishes
differ from the limited class of Statutory Heirs created by the Copyright Act.
Federal judges are also hamstrung, as they are charged only with the task of
applying existing law as enacted by Congress.
In conclusion, Congress should treat certain lifetime gratuitous transfers
to author-controlled, author-benefiting business and nonprobate entities in the
same way that wills are treated. Presumably, wills are excepted from the
termination provisions to, among other things, honor the testator's intent and
testamentary freedom. Both corporate structures that shield personal liability and
will substitutes that avoid probate and offer administrative, business, and tax
benefits, have and will continue to increase in popularity. Therefore, parity in the
treatment of wills and will substitutes is necessary given the rise in importance
and frequency of use of those ACAB vehicles. My suggested amendment will
prevent Statutory Heirs, sometimes disgruntled or greedy (or both), from
terminating the decedent author's lifetime gratuitous transfers and best protect
the author's testamentary intent and valuable copyright. Only then will authors
truly be empowered to reclaim testamentary control of copyright.

378

' See supra Part

I.B.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015). The duration of copyright for a single creator is life of the author
plus 70 years after the author's death. For this reason, it is especially important that authors be
empowered to make author-controlled, author-benefitting transfers that cannot be undone by the
limited class of Statutory Heirs.
379
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